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Epistemology Extended
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
A common presupposition in epistemology is that the processes
contributing to the generation of knowledge do not extend be-
yond the knower’s skin. This paper challenges this presuppo-
sition. I adduce a novel kind case that causes trouble for a
number of even the most promising accounts of knowledge in
current literature (virtue epistemological and modal accounts),
at least so long as the presupposition is in place. I then look at
a couple of recent accounts of knowledge that drop the presup-
position and expressly allow the relevant processes to extended
beyond the knower’s skin. While these accounts can handle the
problem case, they encounter difficulties elsewhere: extension
occurs too easily and so the accounts predict knowledge where
they ought not. Finally, I offer a novel way of extending epis-
temology and argue that it can steer clear of the problems on
both sides.
Introduction
What is knowledge? It was once widely believed that the answer is
that knowledge is justified true belief. Thanks to Gettier [1963], we
know that this can’t be right: one can have a justified true belief and
yet fail to know. We also know that there is no quick way to fix this
shortcoming of the JTB account. The post-Gettier literature teaches
us as much.
That said, there are a number of promising accounts of knowl-
edge in recent literature. One of them has been advanced by virtue
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epistemologists.1 The idea here is that knowledge is a kind of success
due to ability or competence. According to another promising pro-
posal, knowledge features a modal condition. The two most promi-
nent candidates in this camp are that knowledge requires belief that
is sensitive to falsehood2 or safe from error3.
This paper aims to develop a novel type of problem for both virtue
epistemological and modal accounts of knowledge, at least as they
are traditionally understood. Crucially, I do not intend to provide
another Gettier-style counterexample, i.e. a type of case that shows
that the conditions suggested by these accounts are not sufficient for
knowledge after all. Rather, I will try to describe a type of case that
suggests that the conditions imposed are not necessary, i.e. a case of
knowledge in which the suggested conditions are not met (§§2,3).
As I see it, what we will be dealing with is a case of extended
cognition (EC), in a sense that, I hope, will become clear in due
course. That is why, with the argument against traditional versions
of virtue epistemological and modal accounts of knowledge in place,
I will look at a number of ‘extended epistemologies’, which combine
core ideas of relevant virtue epistemological and/or modal accounts
of knowledge with ideas from the literature on extended cognition.
I will argue that two existing extended epistemologies remain ulti-
mately unsatisfactory and develop a novel way of extending episte-
mology that is more promising (§4).
The idea that cases of extended cognition cause trouble for at least
a certain type of virtue epistemological (VE) account of knowledge is
not new. It has been defended by Duncan Pritchard and Krist Vaesen
in a number of recent pieces.4 I do not think that their arguments
are ultimately successful. There is a kind of virtue epistemological
1 Virtue epistemology has been defended, among others, by John Greco [2003,
2010, 2012], Ernest Sosa [2007, 2010, 2011], Wayne Riggs [2002, 2009a, 2009b] and
Linda Zagzebski [1996]. I have also defended a couple of versions of the view in
[Kelp 2011, 2013d].
2 Champions of sensitivity accounts include Robert Nozick [1981], Fred Dretske
[1971, 1981] and more recently, Tim Black and Peter Murphy [2007, 2008] and Kelly
Becker [2007, 2009].
3 For defences of safety see [Sainsbury 1997, Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000,
Pritchard 2005]. For an account that combines a safety condition and a virtue
epistemological condition see [Pritchard et al. 2010, Pritchard 2012, Kelp 2013c].
4 [Pritchard 2010, Vaesen 2011, 2013]. It may be worth noting that Vaesen’s
counterexamples involve at best a very weak version of extended cognition and that
it remains an open question whether his examples are not best seen as involving
cases of embedded cognition. (Thanks to Orestis Palermos for pointing this out to
me.)
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account of knowledge that escapes them unscathed. While I have
already argued this point elsewhere [Kelp 2013a,b] in some detail, it
will be instructive to rehearse some of the relevant arguments here, if
only to bring the contribution of this paper into proper focus. I will
tackle this task in §1.
1 Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s arguments
According to the type of VE Pritchard and Vaesen attack, knowledge
is a kind of success due to ability. More specifically, in the case of
knowledge the relevant kind of success is true belief and the relevant
kind of ability is a cognitive ability, that is, roughly, a disposition to
form true beliefs. While champions of the kind of VE Pritchard and
Vaesen attack typically hold that their preferred virtue condition on
knowledge is not only necessary but also sufficient for knowledge,
the following weaker claims will do for the purposes of this paper:
VE1. S knows that p only if S’s believing p truly is due to the exercise of
cognitive ability.
VE2. S’s belief that p is degettiered if and only if S’s believing p truly is
due to the exercise of cognitive ability.5
A core question that champions of VE will have to answer is what
it takes for a success to be ‘due to’ the exercise of ability. There are
two main contenders in the literature. The first, associated with John
Greco [2003, 2010, 2012], unpacks ‘due to’ in terms of creditability.
Roughly, the idea is that a success is due to the exercise of ability just
in case it is creditable to the exercise of ability. In contrast, the second,
which is most prominently championed by Ernest Sosa [2007, 2010,
2011], unpacks ‘due to’ in terms of competence manifestation. Here
5 Let’s distinguish with Hetherington [e.g. 1999] and Pritchard [e.g. 2008] be-
tween two types of Gettier case. The first one comprises cases in which agents
acquire their beliefs in ways that are epistemically defective in some way (e.g. via
inferences from false premises, deceptive experiences, taking readings from faulty
equipment, etc.). In contrast, the second type of Gettier comprises cases in which
agents do not acquire their beliefs in epistemically defective ways but might easily
have done so. For the purposes of this paper, we can restrict the range of Gettier
cases that VE2 claims to account for to cases of the first type. Since, as even champi-
ons of VE acknowledge, Gettier cases of the second type pose a serious challenge to
their view, it is of some significance that this paper’s argument can proceed under
this restriction. It means that we can be certain that the problem does not reduce
to the already well documented difficulty that arises from cases of the second type.
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the rough idea is that a success is due to the exercise of ability just in
case it manifests ability.
1.1 Creditability VE
Vaesen and Pritchard’s arguments focus on versions of VE that un-
pack ‘due to’ in terms of creditability. The question its champions
will need to answer is to what degree a given success must be cred-
itable to the exercise of ability. Pritchard and Vaesen argue that it
must be primarily so creditable. Otherwise, VE will be incapable of
explaining the absence of knowledge in Gettier cases [Pritchard 2010:
137, Vaesen 2011: 518]. The problem is that this leaves VE vulner-
able to another problem: there are cases in which the agents have
knowledge, but their cognitive successes, if creditable to the agents
at all, are not primarily so creditable. The literature features a num-
ber of different candidates for such cases, the most prominent ones
being certain cases of testimonial knowledge [e.g. Lackey 2007, 2009,
Pritchard 2008, Pritchard et al. 2010]. Crucially for present purposes,
Vaesen and Pritchard argue that cases of extended cognition also fit
the bill. Vaesen even goes so far as to suggest that certain cases of
extended cognition may well be the best such cases [Vaesen 2011:
522].
Pritchard and Vaesen offer different cases of extended cognition
in order to argue against VE. Since I have discussed Vaesen’s case at
length elsewhere [Kelp 2013b], I will here focus on Pritchard’s case:
Notebook. In order to counter his Alzheimer’s-induced loss of memory,
Otto’s wife sets Otto up with a notebook in which Otto is to store
and from which he is to retrieve information in much the same way
in which he had hitherto stored information in and retrieved it again
from memory. Otto’s wife teaches Otto how to use the notebook and
plays a crucial part in ensuring that the system functions effectively.
In virtue of it being an entry in his notebook, Otto believes (or comes
to believe now that he retrieves the information) that he has an ap-
pointment with the doctor today [Pritchard 2010: 149].
Pritchard points out that, intuitively, Otto knows that he has an ap-
pointment with the doctor. At the same time, his true belief does not
appear to be primarily creditable to the cognitive abilities that Otto
exercises here. Otto’s wife gets too large a share of the credit for this
to be plausible.
If this is correct, VE faces a dilemma. Either the degree of cred-
itability required for knowledge is construed robustly in terms of pri-
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mary creditability. In that case, VE may be able to correctly predict
lack of knowledge in Gettier cases, but it will also, and now mistak-
enly, predict lack of knowledge in cases like Notebook. Or the degree
of creditability required for knowledge is construed weakly as not
requiring primary creditability. In that case, VE can correctly predict
knowledge in the latter cases, but will succumb to Gettier cases.
I remain unconvinced by a number of claims assumed by Pritchard
and/or Vaesen, including (i) that VE must unpack ‘due to’ in terms
of primary creditability in order to avoid Gettier cases and (ii) that
cases of extended cognition may well be the best cases to make the
point (Vaesen). That said, I also believe that the argument against
creditability VE is successful independently of whether (i) and (ii)
hold.6
1.2 Competence Manifestation VE
Even if we grant that Pritchard and Vaesen identify a genuine prob-
lem for creditability VE, the question remains whether their argu-
ment is equally successful against Sosa’s competence manifestation
version of the view. As I will argue in the following paragraphs, the
answer to this question is ‘no’. Competence manifestation VE can
escape their arguments unscathed. I will again focus on Pritchard
and refer the reader to my [Kelp 2013b] for a detailed discussion of
Vaesen’s case.
In order to prepare the ground for my response to Pritchard, it
will first be necessary to briefly sketch the most important parts of
Sosa’s [2010, 2011] account of competences and competence manifes-
tation. According to Sosa, competences are dispositions to perform
well. Sosa distinguishes three components of dispositions (and hence
of competences), to wit, constitutional (= CO), inner (= IN) and situ-
ational (= SI). In the case of archery competence, the CO are certain
properties of the agent, including more basic motor and cognitive
competences, the IN include being awake, attentive, etc. and the SI
include there being enough light, normal winds, etc. [Sosa 2010: 465].
Corresponding to these components of competences are three lev-
els of competence. The first, ‘constitutive’ competence includes only
the CO, the second, ‘inner’ competence includes the IN besides the
CO, and the third, ‘complete’ competence includes the CO, IN and
SI. When Sosa says that competences are dispositions to perform
6 For a more detailed argument that even works for Pritchard’s weakened cred-
itability version of VE, see [Kelp 2013c].
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well what he means is that complete competences are dispositions
to perform well in the sense that when an agent has the complete
competence—i.e. CO, IN and SI are in place—were he to produce
a relevant performance it would highly likely be successful. For an
archer to have the competence to hit the target is for him to have a
disposition to hit the target in the sense that if the agent were to pro-
duce a shot in suitable CO, IN and SI, his shot would very likely hit
the target [Sosa 2010: 466].
Crucially, according to Sosa, a success manifests competence only
if it manifests a complete competence [Sosa 2010: 470]. That is to say,
the competence’s CO, IN and SI must all be in place. When a compe-
tence is exercised in unsuitable SI, the performance it produces won’t
qualify as a success that manifests competence, not even if it turns
out to be successful. For instance, when an archer’s shot is blown off
target by a gust of wind, the competence’s SI are not satisfied. As a
result, his shot won’t qualify as a success that manifests competence,
not even if it does after all hit the target, say because a second gust
of wind brings it back on target.
Recall that, according to Sosa’s version of VE, the cognitive suc-
cess at issue in knowledge is due to the exercise of cognitive compe-
tence just in case it manifests competence. With the above account of
competences and competence manifestation in play, we now know
that this means that one’s cognitive success must manifest a complete
competence. This serves to explain why beliefs of agents in standard
Gettier cases do not qualify as knowledge. In such cases, the relevant
competence’s SI are not satisfied (as e.g. the agent is looking at a sur-
face that is illuminated by coloured light, at a non-sheep that looks
just like a sheep, at a stopped clock, etc.). As a result, in standard
Gettier cases, the agent’s cognitive success does not manifest com-
petence. Sosa’s account predicts, correctly, that agents in such cases
lack knowledge.
Of course, in order to escape Pritchard and Vaesen’s argument, it
remains to be shown that the present account of competence manifes-
tation can allow that the true beliefs in cases like Notebook do manifest
competence. To see this, I will first have to add a few more details to
Sosa’s account of competences.
Recall that, according to Sosa, competences are dispositions to
perform well. While this is roughly right, some cases suggest that a
slight refinement is required. Suppose an agent has more than one
way of producing performances of a certain kind. To keep things
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simple, let’s say he has two such ways. For instance, our archer may
shoot with his left hand or with his right hand. Suppose he is dis-
posed to perform well when producing performances of that kind in
one way but not the other. Call the former ‘the good way’ and the lat-
ter ‘the bad way’. Our archer may be disposed to hit the target when
shooting with his right hand, but not when shooting with his left
hand. Suppose, finally, that the agent is disposed to produce perfor-
mances of said kind in the bad way. His dominant way of producing
performances is the bad way. Our archer may be disposed to shoot
with his left hand. In this situation, there is a clear sense in which the
agent is not disposed to perform well. Even so, the agent possesses a
competence to achieve the result, viz. when producing performances
in the good way. It’s just that he is disposed not to exercise this com-
petence. These considerations suggest that competences are relative
to ways of producing performances. Competences are dispositions
to perform well via certain ways of performance production.
Notice next that ways of producing performances may involve
equipment. Our archer’s way of producing shots involves a bow and
arrow. Note also that the SI of equipment-involving competences
may include conditions concerning the quality of the equipment. Our
archer may have the competence to hit the target only in SI such that
his set of bow and arrows are in sufficiently good state. He does not
have the competence to hit the target when the quality of his bow is
degraded to the point of dysfunctionality.
Now, it may be that the (continued) satisfaction of a competence’s
SI is ensured by the efforts of another agent, a supporter. Suppose,
for instance, our archer owns two bows. One bow is now degraded
to the point of dysfunctionality. The other is more durable, at least
given that it is suitably maintained. Suppose the durable set has
been designed and is now maintained by another agent, a supporter.
The supporter also sees to it that our archer uses the durable set
when shooting. Here the supporter ensures that (some of) the SI of
our archer’s competence are in place. What’s more, we can easily
describe the case in such a way that had it not been for the efforts
of the supporter, our archer would now be in unsuitable SI and that
this unfortunate situation might very easily have obtained. In that
case, part of the credit for any success our archer goes on to attain
will go to his supporter. Perhaps the supporter’s share in the credit
is even large enough that these successes are no longer primarily
creditable to our archer. However, and this is the crucial point, it
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does not change the fact that, when SI (as well as CO and IN) are
suitable, our archer rises to the level of complete competence and so,
by Sosa’s lights, may produce successes that manifest competence. By
Sosa’s lights, what is going on in such cases is that our archer rises
to the level of complete competence, although he might very easily
have failed to do so. Again, while this may mean that the degree of
credit he deserves is diminished, it does not mean that, now that he
does rise to the level of complete competence, his successes do not
manifest competence.
The situation is essentially the same in Notebook. Here Otto has
two types of memory, as it were, his biological memory and his ex-
ternal memory, the notebook. His biological memory is degraded to
the point of dysfunctionality. The notebook is more durable, at least
when suitably maintained. It was designed and is now maintained
by Otto’s wife who also sees to it that Otto uses it when forming
memory based beliefs. Now consider Otto’s true belief, formed in a
way involving his notebook in otherwise suitable SI (as well as CO
and IN), that he has an appointment with the doctor today. That Otto
believes truly may be creditable to a significant degree to his wife. It
may be creditable to her in such a way that it can no longer be said to
be primarily creditable to Otto. However, this is not to say that Otto’s
believing the truth does not manifest his competence to form true
beliefs, now that he is forming beliefs in suitable SI. On the contrary,
by Sosa’s lights, it does.
Sosa’s competence manifestation version of VE can accommodate
both the intuition of ignorance in standard Gettier cases and the intu-
ition of knowledge in cases like Notebook. Competence manifestation
VE escapes Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s attack unscathed.
2 The Timekeeper Case
While Pritchard and Vaesen’s arguments remain unsuccessful at least
against competence manifestation VE, this section develops a more
serious problem for the view. To get there let’s first look at a familiar
case:
The Original. The timeseeker looks at a public clock, sees that it reads 2.30
and on that basis comes to believe that it is 2.30. The clock has an
outstanding track-record of functioning properly and the timeseeker
has no reason to think that it is currently not accurate. Her belief is
true. It is in fact 2.30. Unbeknowst to the timeseeker, however, the
clock has stopped exactly twelve hours ago.
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Intuitively, the timeseeker does not know that it’s 2.30. Competence
manifestation VE can readily accommodate this intuition. Among
the SI of the timeseeker’s clock-reading competence is that the clock
is functioning properly. In The Original, this condition is not satisfied.
For that reason, competence manifestiation VE predicts that the time-
seeker’s true belief does not manifest his clock-reading competence
and therefore falls short of knowledge.
Now consider the following variation of the case:
The Timekeeper. The timeseeker looks at a public clock, sees that it reads
2.30 and on that basis comes to believe that it is 2.30. The clock has an
outstanding track-record of functioning properly and the timeseeker
has no reason to think that it is currently not accurate. Her belief
is true. It is in fact 2.30. Unbeknowst to the timeseeker, however,
the clock has stopped exactly twelve hours ago. As it happens, this
episode is observed by the timekeeper, who has been called in to
fix the stopped clock. Using his two radio clocks, the timekeeper
confirms that the reading of the stopped clock is accurate. Had the
stopped clock reading been inaccurate, the timekeeper would have
alerted the timeseeker to this fact.
Here is my intuition about the case: The timeseeker knows that it’s
2.30.7 Competence manifestation VE will find it very difficult to ac-
commodate this intuition, at least whilst continuing to secure the
right verdict in The Original. Here is why. In both cases the time-
seeker acquires his belief in the same way, via an exercise of his
clock-reading competence. As we have already seen, it is plausible
that the SI of the timeseeker’s clock-reading competence include that
the clock be functioning properly. Since in the present case, this con-
dition is not satisfied, competence manifestation VE will predict that,
here too, the timeseeker’s true belief does not manifest competence
and therefore falls short of knowledge.8
7 If you do not share this intuition, consider a variation of the case in which the
timekeeper’s involvement is modally robust rather than a mere accident. Notice
that if you now get the intuition of knowledge, the case will still serve to generate
a problem for both non-extended versions of VE and for (VE combined with) the
extended epistemologies discussed in §§4.1, 4.2. (Thanks to Jesper Kallestrup for
drawing my attention to this.) If you still do not have the intuition that the time-
seeker knows, I will provide some independent reason to think that he does in the
conclusion, at least for those who accept the hypothesis of extended cognition.
8 The Timekeeper is no less problematic for creditability VE. After all, it would
seem that the degree to which the timeseeker’s cognitive success is creditable to
her is the same in The Original and The Timekeeper. If so, creditability VE will be
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3 Modal Accounts of Knowledge
It turns out that VE is in trouble. This might be an opening for
champions of modal accounts of knowledge. If some modal account
can avoid the problems that VE encounters, we might have reason to
favour it over VE. For that reason, in what follows, I will look at the
two most prominent modal accounts of knowledge and investigate
whether they can successfully handle the two versions of the stopped
clock case.
3.1 Sensitivity
According to the first of these accounts, knowledge requires belief
that is sensitive to falsehood. Roughly, this means that one knows
that p only if were p false, one would not believe that p. While this is
indeed roughly right, it is now widely acknowledged that a further
refinement is needed. The sensitivity condition must be indexed to
ways (or methods) of belief formation. Here is how Nozick, one of
the most prominent advocates of this kind of view, formulates his
version of the sensitivity condition (SEN):
SEN1. S knows that p via method M only if: “if p weren’t true and S
were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, then S wouldn’t
believe, via M, that p.” [Nozick 1981: 179]
In addition, I will, again in line with Nozick, assume a standard
possible worlds semantics for counterfactual conditionals of the kind
at issue in the sensitivity condition. According to this semantics, a
sentence of the form “if φ were the case, then ψ would be the case”
is true just in case ψ is true at the closest worlds at which φ is true.
This gives us the following alternative statement of the sensitivity
account:
SEN1. S knows that p via method M only if: at all the closest worlds at
which p is not true and S uses M to arrive at a belief whether (or not)
p, then S does not believe, via M, that p.
It is worth noting that Nozick countenances a further condition on
knowledge besides SEN that is meant to do some anti-Gettier duty.
Since all the Gettier cases in this paper are either handled by SEN1
or else satisfy Nozick’s further condition, for present purposes it will
be safe to assume the following additional thesis:
hard pressed to accommodate both the intuition of ignorance in the former and the
intuition of knowledge in the latter.
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SEN2. S’s belief that p via method M is degettiered if and only if: at all
the closest worlds at which p is not true and S uses M to arrive at a
belief whether (or not) p, then S does not believe, via M, that p.
Just as VE, SEN handles The Original without further difficulties.
Among the closest worlds at which it is not 2.30 and the timeseeker
forms a belief that it is 2.30 via his clock-reading competence, are
worlds at which the clock that she looks at continues to be stopped
at 2.30. At those worlds, the timeseeker will form a false belief that
it is 2.30 via her clock-reading competence. So SEN is not satisfied.
SEN predicts, correctly, that the timeseeker does not know.
But what about The Timekeeper? Does SEN allow us to make any
progress on this front? One might initially think that it does. After
all, at the closest worlds at which it is not 2.30, it is 2.29 or 2.31.
At those worlds, one might think, the timekeeper would step in and
inform the timekeeper that it is in fact 2.29 rather than 2.30 in which
case the timeseeker would not believe that it is 2.30 via his clock-
reading competence. SEN appears to be satisfied.
On second thought, however, it is not so clear that this is right.
To see this, let’s ask what else happens at the closest worlds at which
it is not 2.30. Does the timekeeper continue to arrive at 2.30 in at
least some of them? If so, then there will be some subset of the
closest worlds at which the timeseeker will already have formed his
false belief that it’s 2.30 before the timeseeker has a chance to correct
him. This problem would be avoided, if worlds at which the time-
keeper continues to watch over the timeseeker are closer than worlds
at which he continues to arrive at 2.30. Unfortunately, it is hard to see
on what grounds it could be argued that the former worlds are closer
than the latter. What’s even worse, the case can easily be redescribed
in such a way that it is plausible that worlds at which the timekeeper
watches over the timeseeker are further away than worlds at which
he does not watch over him at all. All that needs to be done is add
that, by some accident, the timeseeker was delayed and for that rea-
son arrived at the clock later than she otherwise would have, while,
again due to some accident, the timekeeper was lucky enough to ar-
rive at the clock earlier than he otherwise would have. In that case,
it would seem that the closest worlds at which it is not 2.30 include
worlds at which the timeseeker and the timekeeper do not overlap.
At those worlds, the timeseeker will of course form a false belief that
it is 2.30 via his clock-reading competence. SEN predicts, incorrectly,
that the timeseeker’s actual belief falls short of knowledge.
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3.2 Safety
For many the failure of SEN will not come as a big surprise. After all,
the view faces a number of problems that many would consider even
more serious than the one that may arise from making the wrong
prediction in a case like The Timekeeper. Indeed problems besetting
SEN have motivated sympathisers with modal accounts to prefer a
safety-based account of knowledge (SAF), which is often thought to
fare better than SEN. According to a rough version of SAF, knowl-
edge requires that one might not easily have been in error. Again,
the rough version is refined by an index to ways of belief formation.
The resulting version of SAF can be stated as follows:
SAF1. S knows that p via method M only if: not easily might S arrive at a
false belief on whether p via M.
SAF2. S’s belief that p via method M is degettiered if and only if: not
easily might S arrive at a false belief on whether p via M.
Given a standard possible worlds semantics for ‘might easily’ accord-
ing to which a sentence of the form “It might easily be the case that
φ” is true if and only if at some close possible world φ is true, we get
the following alternative version of the safety condition:
SAF1. S knows that p via method M only if: there are no close possible
worlds such that S arrives at a false belief on whether p via M.
SAF2. S’s belief that p via method M is degettiered if and only if: there
are no close possible worlds such that S arrives at a false belief on
whether p via M.
Does SAF fare any better than SEN? No. There are many close pos-
sible worlds at which the timeseeker arrives a minute early whilst
the timekeeper continues to arrive at the same time. At those pos-
sible worlds, the timeseeker acquires a false belief that it is 8.30 via
his clock-reading competence. Her belief is thus not safe. SAF also
makes the incorrect prediction that the timeseeker does not know.9
9 Couldn’t champions of a safety condition venture to avoid modify the re-
quirement imposed on knowledge? Pritchard has argued that there is independent
reason to opt for the following weaker version of safety:
SAF∗1 . S knows that p via method M only if: S avoids false belief on
whether p via M at all very close possible worlds and at most close
possible worlds [Pritchard 2007: 292].
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The Timekeeper thus poses a problem not only for VE but also for
modal accounts of knowledge. This is bad news as it means that two
of the most promising types of account in recent epistemology, per-
haps the two most promising types, are in trouble. The next section
investigates how, if at all, we might be able to deal with this problem.
4 Extended Epistemologies
The timekeeper plays a crucial part in The Timekeeper. A core reason
why the timeseeker knows the time in that case is that the time-
keeper (i) independently verifies the time and (ii) would alert the
timeseeker had the clock reading been inaccurate. The trouble for
standard virtue epistemological and modal accounts of knowledge
arises from the fact that they do not make provisions for positive
epistemic status’s depending on other agents in this way. How can
this defect be remedied?
4.1 Green’s Joint Abilities Virtue Epistemology
Adam Green [2012] has recently offered an extended version of virtue
epistemology that, one might think, holds out the hope of doing the
trick for us. In an effort to marry creditability VE with the idea
that the processes involved in the generation of testimonial belief
include the processes involved in the production of testimony [Gold-
berg 2010], he proposes the following ‘joint abilities virtue epistemol-
ogy’ (JAVE):
JAVE1. “[S] knows that p only if the abilities that contribute to the for-
mation and sustenance of [S]’s belief that p deserve primary credit
(or something close to it) for [S] knowing p whether those abilities are
contributed solely by [S] or also by other agents.” [Green 2012: 125]
SAF∗2 . S’s belief that p via method M is degettiered if and only if: S avoids
false belief on whether p via M at all very close possible worlds and
at most close possible worlds.
There is little reason to think that this weakening of safety will allow us to make
progress on The Timekeeper. After all, it is plausible that worlds at which the time-
seeker arrives a minute early while the timekeeper continues to arrive at the same
time are among the very close possible worlds. If so, SAF∗ is not satisfied either.
What’s more, if the case is set up in the way described in the above discussion of
SEN, where it is accidental that the timeseeker arrives as late as at 8.30 and the
timekeeper as early as 8.30, at most close worlds, the timeseeker arrives early and
doesn’t overlap with the timekeeper. At those worlds, she will form a false belief
that it is 8.30 via her clock-reading competence.
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JAVE2. S’s belief that p is degettiered if and only if the abilities that con-
tribute to the formation and sustenance of S’s belief that p deserve
primary credit (or something close to it) for S knowing p whether
those abilities are contributed solely by S or also by other agents.10
Initially it may not be obvious just how JAVE could allow us to make
progress on The Timekeeper. After all, it is not clear that the time-
keeper’s abilities contribute to the formation and sustenance of the
timeseeker’s belief that it is 8.30. But, of course, if they don’t, JAVE
is bound to predict ignorance as well.
That said, there is a way of looking at the case in which the time-
keeper’s ability does make a contribution to the formation and sus-
tenance of the timeseeker’s belief. To see how, notice first that we
are equipped with monitoring abilities, which detect unfavourable
environmental conditions and lead us to refrain from forming be-
liefs or to retract beliefs already formed. For instance, upon realising
that the only light source of the room is a blacklight, I refrain from
forming beliefs about the colours of the objects around me (by colour
vision only). But now notice that, in The Timekeeper, the timekeeper’s
abilities play a similar role for the timeseeker’s belief about the time.
Were environmental conditions unfavourable, i.e. were the clock not
to display the right time, the timekeeper would alert the timeseeker
of this fact, which, in turn, would lead the latter to refraining from
forming a belief. I want to suggest, then, that we may think of the
timekeeper as contributing a kind of monitoring ability to the forma-
tion/sustenance of the timeseeker’s belief. It’s just that, in the case of
the timeseeker and the timekeeper, these abilities are external to the
relevant cognitive agent (the timeseeker) rather than internal.
If we view the timekeeper as contributing a monitoring ability to
the timeseeker’s belief, it would seem that JAVE is ideally suited to
pass the correct verdict in The Timekeeper. It may be hard to deny
that the contribution of the timeseeker’s clock-reading ability by it-
self does not deserve primary credit for her cognitive success. At
10 Note that Green should have no qualms with JAVE2. After all, Green explic-
itly claims that he wants to retain “the spirit of Greco” [Green 2012: 125]. It is
not hard to see that JAVE won’t do that unless Green is prepared to accept at least
JAVE2 besides JAVE1. After all, according to Greco, a virtue condition is not only
necessary but also sufficient for knowledge. Furthermore, there is reason to believe
that Green does in fact accept a thesis entailing JAVE2 when he claims that virtue
epistemologies, like Greco’s and JAVE, do not merely aim to specify “a necessary
condition on knowledge but . . . the necessary condition on knowledge . . . that de-
fines the epistemic enterprise.” [Green 2012: 125]
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the same time, it is fairly plausible that the joint contribution of the
timeseeker’s clock-reading ability and the timekeeper’s monitoring
ability do deserve such primary credit. If so, JAVE can successfully
accommodate the intuition of knowledge in The Timekeeper.
It is also worth noting that this does not compromise JAVE’s abil-
ity to explain lack of knowledge in a wide range of standard Gettier
cases. Thus consider The Original once more. The only abilities that
contribute to the formation of the timeseeker’s belief are his own abil-
ities. At the same time, the contribution to cognitive success made
by the timeseeker’s abilities alone is no more deserving of primary
credit here than in The Timekeeper. In consequence, JAVE can success-
fully predict lack of knowledge in The Original.
While JAVE may thus look promising, unfortunately, there is rea-
son to believe that it remains unsuccessful after all. There is reason
to believe that it succumbs to Gettier cases of a different kind. Here
is one such case:
The Gettieriser. The timeseeker looks at a public clock, sees that it reads
2.30 and on that basis comes to believe that it is 2.30. The clock has an
outstanding track-record of functioning properly and the timeseeker
has no reason to think that it is currently not accurate. Her belief is
true. It is in fact 2.30. Unbeknowst to the timeseeker, however, the
clock is stopped but nonetheless displays the time accurately because
the gettieriser, who tries to maximise the number of gettiered belief in
the world, happened to pass by and seized the opportunity by setting
the clock exactly to the right time.
In this case, the timeseeker’s belief is gettiered (and hence does not
qualify as knowledge). At the same time, it is hard to see how JAVE
could accommodate this datum. To see this, notice first that, in this
case, the abilities of the gettieriser make a very clear contribution
to the formation and sustenance of the timeseeker’s belief that it is
2.30: the gettieriser contributes the reading of the clock. Now, while
it is plausible that the contribution of the timeseeker’s own ability
is not sufficient to be deserving of primary credit for his cognitive
success, the joint contribution of the gettieriser’s and the timeseeker’s
ability would appear to be. If it is, JAVE predicts, incorrectly, that the
timeseeker’s belief is not gettiered.
Notice that, at this stage, we don’t even need to claim that JAVE
falls prey to gettierisation. Rather, all that we need to generate a
problem for JAVE is the more cautious conditional claim that if the
joint contribution of the timeseeker and the timekeeper’s abilities in
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The Timekeeper is deserving of primary credit, then so is the joint
contribution of the timeseeker and the gettieriser’s abilities in The
Gettieriser. The conditional claim suffices to generate a familiar type
dilemma for JAVE: If the timeseeker and timekeeper’s joint contri-
bution is deserving for primary credit in The Timekeeper, JAVE can
explain the intuition of knowledge here. Unfortunately, however, by
the conditional claim, champions of JAVE will also have to acknowl-
edge that the joint contribution of the timeseeker and the gettieriser
is deserving of primary credit and JAVE will predict, incorrectly, that
the timeseeker’s belief in The Gettieriser is degettiered. On the other
hand, if champions of JAVE were to claim that the contribution of
the timeseeker and the gettieriser are insufficient for primary credit,
then JAVE be able to accommodate the intuitive lack of knowledge
in The Gettieriser. But now, by the conditional claim again, the joint
contribution of the timeseeker and the timekeeper is insufficient for
primary credit and so JAVE predicts lack of knowledge in The Time-
keeper. Either way, JAVE remains ultimately unsatisfactory.
4.2 Hetherington’s Hypothesis of Extended Agents
There is another way of extending epistemology, due to Stephen Het-
herington [2012], that may enable us to accommodate the intuition of
knowledge in The Timekeeper.
According to Hetherington’s proposal, the epistemic agent ex-
tends beyond the boundaries of persons (i.e., roughly, the biologi-
cal boundaries of human beings) and may include various aspects
of his environment. Hetherington states his ‘hypothesis of extended
agents’ (HEA) in the following passage:
I am suggesting that . . . the epistemic agent is the person-plus-
more-besides. It can be, for instance, the person being reliable by
consulting a thermometer – the person-plus-the-thermometer, for
a start – when forming a belief about the temperature around
her. Even if roughly, the person is thus conceptually distinct
from the epistemic agent. Who, then, is it who knows? The
person-by-using-the-thermometer knows; the person-plus-the-ther-
mometer knows. That unity knows; it is the agent of the know-
ing.
[Hetherington 2012: 213]
Here is how one might put HEA to use in analysing The Time-
keeper. Suppose, in keeping with HEA, we allow the epistemic agent
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to extend beyond the boundaries of the timeseeker’s body. In partic-
ular, suppose that the epistemic agent in The Timekeeper is not just the
timeseeker but the timeseeker-plus-the-clock-plus-the-timekeeper (hence-
forth ‘TCT’ for short). Suppose, furthermore, that we interpret the
agent variables in relevant virtue epistemological and modal condi-
tions on knowledge accordingly. Note that, on this proposal, it is safe
to drop the index to methods, as the methods have become part of
the agent, as it were.
It is not hard to see that this move will do the trick for modal
accounts of knowledge. At the closest worlds at which it is not 8.30
TCT will not believe that it is 8.30. After all, at those worlds the
timekeeper alerts the timeseeker of the fact that the clock is inaccurate
and the belief is not formed. TCT’s belief turns out sensitive after all.
Similarly, TCT avoids false belief whether it’s 8.30 across close
worlds. Again, at worlds at which it isn’t 8.30 the timekeeper will
step in and alert the timeseeker to the inaccuracy of the clock. Again
the belief that it is 8.30 will not be formed. TCT’s belief turns out
safe as well.
The situation is slightly less obvious in the case of virtue episte-
mology. The trick here is that, given that the belief is formed by the
extended agent, TCT, the corresponding competence’s SI do not in-
clude that the clock be functioning properly. If this isn’t immediately
obvious, notice that, TCT is disposed to perform well cognitively
even in SI in which the clock is stopped and so TCT’s clock-reading
competence may extend to such SI. As a result, TCT can rise to the
level of complete competence even when looking at a stopped clock.
TCT’s belief may qualify as knowledge by the lights of virtue episte-
mology, too.
Unfortunately, Hetherington’s version of HEA account also has
some serious drawbacks.
First, suppose we accept this HEA-based analysis of The Time-
keeper. One question that we have to answer is what goes on in The
Gettieriser. After all, if we allow the epistemic agent to extend beyond
the timeseeker’s skin and to include the clock and the gettieriser,
it would seem that modal and virtue epistemological accounts that
adopt Hetherington’s version of HEA will predict, however now in-
correctly, that the extended agent’s belief is degettiered.
The second problem affects Hetherington’s version of HEA more
directly. Why are some things agents, whilst other aren’t? Why do
humans, animals, God and committees but not earthquakes, winds
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and natural selection qualify? The overwhelmingly plausible answer
is that it has to do with the fact that they possess the capacity for
intentional action. By the same token, we would expect that cases
of extended agency contribute to the explanation of how the agent
so extended possesses the capacity for intentional action. Consider,
for instance, Clark and Chalmers’s [1998] argument for the extended
mind. Suppose they are right and certain mental states are located
outside the person’s skin. In that case it is also plausible that the
agent extends beyond the person’s skin. After all, it is plausible that
in order to have the capacity for intentional action, one must possess
a psychology involving a set of functionally connected mental states
in terms of which certain behaviours can be explained as intentional
actions. If some of these mental states are located outside the person’s
skin, parts of their capacity for intentional action will be explained in
terms of these external mental states.
Let’s now ask whether we have any reason to think that agents are
extended in the way Hetherington suggests. What contribution does
the hypothesis that, for instance, the agent who knows that it is 19◦C
at time t and location l is a person-plus-thermometer rather than
just a person make to the explanation of the capacity for intentional
action? If it could be argued that the mental state involved in the
agent’s knowledge is held by the extended agent rather than just
by the person, we’d have an answer. We could appeal to the above
argument from extension of minds to extensions of agency. But now
notice just how implausible it is that the relevant mental state is held
by the extended agent rather than by the person only. After all, if
it were the extended agent rather than the person who holds the
mental state, the mental state could not be expected to survive the
destruction of the non-personal parts of the extended agent. Clearly,
however, it can. One can continue to believe that it is 19◦C at t and
l even when the thermometer that was involved in the generation of
the relevant mental state no longer exists.11 So, the kind of agent
extension Hetherington proposes cannot be justified by appeal to the
idea that the relevant mental states are held by the extended agent.
But then how can it be justified? What other contribution could the
external parts of the extended agent make to the explanation of the
11 Notice also how different the situation is in Clark and Chalmers’s case of Otto.
If Otto’s notebook were destroyed, the dispositional beliefs located there would be
cease to exist as well. Here it is plausible that it is the extended agent rather than
the person who has the mental state.
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capacity for intentional action that would be lost if we assumed that
the agent were a person only? I cannot see any.
4.3 Extended Methods and TECSs
In what follows, I will try to sketch a way of dealing with The Time-
keeper that, I hope, is more successful than Green’s and Hethering-
ton’s are. The basic idea is that the case is a case of extended cogni-
tion. Crucially, it is the timeseeker’s way of belief-formation or method
that extends beyond his skin. More specifically, I want suggest that
the timeseeker’s method is a complex whole. It includes an on-board
part and an external part. While the on-board part is a standard
clock-reading process, the external part, which is contributed by the
timekeeper, is a monitoring process that would alert the timeseeker to
inaccuracies of clock readings.
In order to get this proposal off the ground, we will have to an-
swer at least the following three questions:
Question 1. Can we plausibly take the timeseeker’s method to be extended
in this way?
Question 2. Does the proposal enable modal and virtue epistemological
accounts of knowledge to accommodate the intuition of knowledge
in The Timekeeper?
Question 3. Can we still accommodate the intuition of ignorance in The
Gettieriser?
Let’s first turn to Question 1. Champions of the hypothesis of ex-
tended cognition typically accept Clark and Chalmers’s ‘parity prin-
ciple’ (PP):
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as
a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive
process.
[Clark and Chalmers 1998: 8]
As far as PP is concerned, there is no problem for the present strategy.
If the timeseeker had (and used) an internal monitoring process of the
sort now contributed by the timekeeper, we would have no qualms
about accepting it as part of his way of belief formation or method.
If the timeseeker had been fitted with an internal time measuring
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device that would alert him to inaccuracies of external-world clocks,
we would have no hesitation in accepting it as part of his way of
forming beliefs about the time.12
A difficulty may yet arise from another requirement on extended
cognition that Clark and Chalmers countenance. They acknowledge
that coupled systems (i.e. cognitive systems in which some of the
processing is done externally) require the reliable coupling of the in-
ternal and the relevant external components. Moreover, the relevant
sense of reliability they appear to have in mind is unpacked in terms
of how easily the coupled system may have been decoupled [Clark
and Chalmers 1998: 10-11]. It is not hard to see that this requirement
poses a real difficulty for the present proposal. After all, the coupling
between the timeseeker’s clock-reading process and the timekeeper’s
monitoring process is highly fragile and the system is very easily de-
coupled (in fact it will likely be decoupled before the timeseeker uses
his clock-reading process again).
Fortunately, at least Clark has backtracked from the reliability re-
quirement. In a more recent paper, Wilson and Clark argue that there
may be cases of “extended systems that involve temporary, tran-
sient forms of cognitive augmentation”, which they call “Transient
Extended Cognitive Systems” or “TECSs” [Wilson and Clark 2009:
65]. Wilson and Clark are very clear that, while there will be TECSs
involving reliable couplings with the extended parts, there may also
be short-lived TECSs, featuring only one-off couplings. Now, if we
allow for such short-lived TECSs, the prospects for the present pro-
posal become brighter again.
What does matter to whether we are dealing with an extended
system is that “it needs to achieve functional integrity when operat-
ing together with the rest of some cognitive system that serves the
kinds of purposes that that cognitive system has served”. [Wilson
and Clark 2009: 63] Notice that this is very plausibly achieved here.
The purpose of the timeseeker’s clock-reading method is to reliably
12 It may be worth noting that, use of such monitoring processes is no exception.
I look at a pendulum clock, see that it reads 2.30 and yet do not form the corre-
sponding belief: I also see that the pendulum is not moving. I use a monitoring
process that alerts me to the fact that the clock is likely inaccurate. Notice that be-
liefs about the time I form by looking at pendulum clocks are regularly formed via
a method including this monitoring process even when it does not become active.
For that reason, when I form a belief that it is 2.30 on the basis of a reading of a
pendulum clock with a moving pendulum, my belief is formed via a method that
includes a monitoring process of the same general kind as the one contributed by
the timekeeper in The Timekeeper.
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lead her to true beliefs (or perhaps knowledge) about the time. The
contribution that a monitoring process makes to the method is to
enhance the reliability by preventing the formation of beliefs (or by
retracting existing beliefs) in conditions in which the the first-order
process is unreliable. In The Timekeeper, the external monitoring pro-
cess achieves this just as effectively and smoothly as their familiar
on-board cousins. Functional integrity is plausibly achieved here.
Since the timeseeker’s method satisfies PP and since it achieves
the relevant functional integrity, we can, with Wilson and Clark, view
it as a TECS including an on-board clock-reading process and an ex-
ternal monitoring process. The answer to Question 1, then, is posi-
tive.13
Let’s move on to Question 2. Given that the timeseeker’s method
or way of belief-formation is such a TECS, can we accommodate the
intuition of knowledge?
It is not hard to see that, for modal accounts of knowledge, the
answer is ‘yes’. At the closest worlds at which it is not 8.30 and the
timeseeker uses this TECS to arrive at a belief whether it is 8.30, he
will not believe via the extended method that it is 8.30. After all, at
those worlds the timekeeper will have alerted her of the fact that the
clock is stopped. Hence, if the timeseeker’s method is extended in
the way envisaged, her belief turns out sensitive after all.
Similarly, at close worlds at which the timeseeker uses the TECS,
she does not arrive at a false belief whether it’s 8.30. Again, at worlds
13 It may be worth mentioning that, even among champions of the hypothesis
of extended cognition, the question whether transient forms of cognitive extension
are possible remains a matter of controversy. (Thanks to Cameron Boult for point-
ing this out to me.) For the purposes of my argument, I will assume that this
controversy can be resolved in a favourable way and will leave it to my colleagues
in the philosophy of mind to do so. That said, there is some reason to think that
the transient kinds of coupling I need here are possible when it comes to the ways
of performing at issue in abilities. An archer may have the ability to hit the target
in certain IN and SI only with very rare equipment, say, a type of bow of which
only one copy exists. It may also be that the coupling between archer and the bow
is highly unreliable: The archer has been granted use of it by the owner on a whim
and for a very short period of time only. Even so, when the archer shoots with
the bow in IN and SI, he may rise to the level of complete competence and, as a
result, may attain successes that manifest competence. In the case of the ways of
performing at issue in abilities, then, unreliable coupling with crucial equipment is
compatible with complete competence. If so, one might think that the same holds
for ways of belief formation. So long as the coupling is achieved, whether reliably
or not, the agent may rise to the level of complete competence, in which case, by
the lights of VE at least, the beliefs he forms may qualify as knowledge (see also
below).
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at which it isn’t 8.30 the timekeeper will step in and alert her to the
fact that the clock is stopped. Hence, if the timeseeker’s method is
the TECS, her belief turns out safe.
To see how VE can accommodate the intuition of knowledge, note
that given that the way of belief formation is the relevant TECS, the
corresponding competence’s SI do not include that the clock be func-
tioning properly. After all, using the TECS disposes the agent to
perform well cognitively even in SI in which the clock is stopped. As
a result, the timeseeker can rise to the level of complete competence
even when he is looking at a stopped clock. Her belief may qualify
as knowledge by the lights of virtue epistemology as well. We thus
also have a positive answer to Question 2.
This leaves Question 3, i.e. the question whether we can also ac-
commodate the intuition of ignorance in The Gettieriser. Notice that
if the timeseeker’s method is exhausted by his on-board processes,
we will be able to secure a positive answer. After all, in that case,
The Gettieriser is in all relevant respects analogous to The Original.
And we have already seen this case does not pose a significant dif-
ficulty for modal or virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge.
On the other hand, a difficulty looms if the timeseeker’s method ex-
tends beyond his skin and includes the doings of the gettieriser in
much the same way as, by the above analysis of The Timekeeper, her
method extends to include the monitoring process contributed by the
timekeeper. After all, in that case, it would seem as though the be-
liefs will satisfy the anti-Gettier conditions of our modal and virtue
epistemological accounts. The accounts predict, mistakenly, that the
timeseeker’s belief is not gettiered.
So let’s ask whether the timeseeker’s method in The Gettieriser can
plausibly be thought to extend beyond her skin in this way. Consider,
once more PP: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world func-
tions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have
no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then
that part of the world is part of the cognitive process. Do the get-
tieriser’s doings satisfy PP? One might think it does not. After all,
how could the setting of some clock occur in the timeseeker’s head?
Well, suppose that the timeseeker had a brain-implant that happens
to interfere with the clock in much the same way as the gettieriser
does in the problematic case. But even so, the process is not occur-
ring in the timeseeker’s head. After all, the clock remains an external
object. So suppose that the stopped clock the timeseeker consults is
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an internal (e.g. mental) clock. Unbeknownst to the timeseeker, the
internal clock is stopped and yet displays the time accurately because
another cognitive (sub)system happens to set it to the right time just
before the timeseeker consults it.
This is the best attempt at offering an internal analogue to The
Gettieriser that I can think of. At the same time, I must confess that
I am not quite sure what to make of it. The case is so bizarre that I
have little inclination to pass any verdict of philosophical substance
whatsoever about it, and certainly not without hesitation. If I am not
the only one feels this way about the case, the prospects for a positive
answer to Question 3 are starting to looking up. After all, in that case,
PP does not enjoin us to view the timeseeker’s method as extending
to the gettieriser. If it doesn’t, The Gettieriser is structurally analogous
to The Original and so does not pose any special difficulties for the
present proposal.14
Conclusion
If the argument I have developed in this paper goes through, we have
some reason to opt for an extended rather than a traditional (non-
extended) epistemology. There are cases, notably The Timekeeper, that
pose a problem for even our most promising traditional accounts of
knowledge, but can be dealt with nicely by (at least a certain type of)
14 Of course, PP offers only a sufficient condition for extension, not a necessary
one, and so we have no conclusive evidence that the timeseeker’s method does
not extend to the gettieriser. At the same time, given that PP is all we have to
work with, we at least have no reason to think that the timeseeker’s method does
extend to the gettieriser. So, we can leave it to critics of the present account to
produce such a reason. In addition, there is reason to think that champions of
the extended cognition hypothesis will do well to try and avoid allowing exten-
sion of the timeseeker’s method to the gettieriser. After all, for any version of the
extended cognition hypothesis on which the timeseeker’s method does so extend,
even modal and virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge will predict, incor-
rectly, that the timeseeker’s belief is not gettiered. That means that even our most
promising accounts of the anti-Gettier condition are bound to fail. The envisaged
versions of the extended cognition hypothesis would turn out to have highly un-
desirable epistemological consequences. As epistemologists, then, we are in the
fortunate position of leaving it to our critics to produce reason to believe that the
timeseeker’s method extends to the gettieriser in the potentially problematic way
and to our colleagues in the philosophy of mind to remedy the defect should our
critics succeed. Of course, if all of this came to pass, we could no longer be assured
that the proposed account of The Timekeeper will continue to work in the way envis-
aged. Even so, there is not much we can do about this now. We will have to wait
for our critics to make their move.
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extended epistemology. Notice that the case also serves to provide
epistemological evidence in support of the extended cognition hy-
pothesis. Given that the timeseeker has knowledge and the only way
to accommodate this datum is by appeal to cognitive extension, there
is epistemological evidence that the hypothesis of extended cogni-
tion is true. On the other hand, given that the timeseeker’s method
extends to the timekeeper, there is also reason to believe that the
timeseeker does indeed acquire knowledge in this case. After all, in
that case, her belief not only satisfies a number of our most promis-
ing degettierisation conditions on knowledge, but it is also acquired
via a method the internal counterpart of which would uncontrover-
sially deliver knowledge. Once we accept the hypothesis of extended
cognition, it would seem to be mere prejudice not to regard this case
as a case of knowledge. To the extent that the hypothesis of extended
cognition is independently plausible, then, we have evidence from
the philosophy of mind that the timeseeker does really know in this
case. In this way, the intuition that, in The Timekeeper, the timeseeker
knows and the extended cognition hypothesis constitute mutually
reinforcing strands of evidence.
Once we opt for an extended epistemology The Timekeeper be-
comes tractable. In fact, I have argued that there are a number of
extended epistemologies that can get this case right. However, these
views encounter difficulties elsewhere. The task that extended episte-
mologies face is to avoid extensions to occur too easily. More specif-
ically, they must avoid them in certain types of Gettier case such as
The Gettieriser. I have shown that two existing versions of extended
epistemology, to wit, Green’s joint abilities and Hetherington’s ex-
tended agents account, fail on this count. Fortunately, there is reason
to think that there is a workable kind of extended epistemology af-
ter all. I have sketched one such view on which what extends is the
agent’s method and I have argued that it can retain the benefits an
extended epistemology promises, whilst avoiding at least some of the
pitfalls this type of view encounters.15
15 Acknowledgements. Many thanks to Harmen Ghijsen, Sandy Goldberg, Jesper
Kallestrup, Duncan Pritchard and the audience of the Second Workshop on Extended
Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh for helpful discussions of this paper.
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